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Prospects for a European Welfare State.  
Lessons from Welfare State Development in six OECD-Federations 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the findings of a very recent major international research collaboration 
on the impact of federal arrangements on the development of the welfare state to ex-
plore the possibilities of progress beyond Europe’s present diversity of nation-state wel-
fare standards. These findings – based on the longterm historical experience of the 
OECD’s oldest federations – suggest that federal arrangements tend to slow down wel-
fare state consolidation, but that much depends on the context of historical develop-
ment. The emergence of bypass mechanisms circumventing federal veto-points is lo-
cated as the key to welfare progress, and the role of regulation in European integration 
and the special role of the ECJ as well as that of ‘the open method of co-ordination’ are 
tentatively identified as possible EU bypass equivalents. 
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Prospects for a European Welfare State.  
Lessons from Welfare State Development in six OECD-Federations 
INTRODUCTION 
Arguably, the welfare state is the most important source of output legitimation in the 
modern state and a powerful device for promoting social integration in divided socie-
ties. The welfare state is not only recognised as an instrument for mediating class con-
flict but also as a mechanism of nation- and state-building capable of containing cen-
trifugal forces in ethnically and politically divided nations (Banting 1995; 2004).  
All these functions are of immediate relevance to the situation of the European Un-
ion. Given the EU’s frequently lamented lack of input legitimation and its multi-cultural 
and multi-ethnic make-up, the emergence of a European welfare state might not only 
help in overcoming the numerous societal and economic cleavages in Europe, but also 
strengthen European identity and the legitimacy of EU-authorities. Moreover, the deep-
ening of EU economic integration in recent decades has increased the pressure for a 
strengthening of the social dimension of Europe in order to level out the asymmetry of 
economic and political integration (Scharpf 2002).  
This essay evaluates the prospects for the emergence of a European welfare state 
based on the past experience of welfare state consolidation in six affluent OECD federa-
tions. They are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland 
and the United States of America. Applying these findings to the European multi-level 
system, we argue that Europe is caught in a development trap, arising from a joint-
decision trap and deep political and economic cleavages. We analyse the mechanisms 
that make it difficult for Europe to overcome its built-in institutional rigidities and 
launch major social transfer programs at the European tier with a view to enhancing 
output legitimation and deepening social cohesion. Moreover, we suggest that the ex-
periences of European and New World federations provide powerful insights for under-
standing prevailing modes of European social policy development, including ‘bypass 
strategies’ such as the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), and regulatory strategies 
of policy development. 
First, we provide a brief survey of theoretical accounts of the ways in which multi-
level systems impact on the dynamics of welfare state development and patterns of wel-
fare provision. We then report core findings of a recently completed collaborative re-
search project in which we examined the impact of federalism on welfare state devel-
opment in the six classic federations in the OECD-World. Finally, we use these findings 
to analyse the patterns of and the prospects for social policy development at the Euro-
pean level. 
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1.  WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT IN MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEMS: 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
Typically, the EU is described as a multi-level or quasi-federal system that allocates 
policy jurisdiction across several tiers of government and where actors from the differ-
ent levels are involved in the decision-making process at the central tier. More specifi-
cally, we may describe such a system as 
¾ a set of institutional arrangements and decision rules at the central level for in-
corporating territorially-based interests; these arrangements vary in the degree to 
which they provide veto powers to subordinate branches of government;  
¾ a set of territorially-based actors with ideas and interests that vary greatly in 
number and heterogeneity; 
¾ a set of jurisdictional arrangements for allocating policy responsibilities between 
different levels of government; this refers to both policy-making and policy-
implementation; 
¾ a set of intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements; and  
¾ a set of informal arrangements—both vertical and horizontal—between govern-
ments.  
What are the repercussions of such an institutional arrangement for welfare state devel-
opment? More specifically, what are the chances for deepening the positive integration 
of social affairs in Europe under circumstance of quasi-federal decision-making? Previ-
ous systematic comparative research and most theoretical accounts of the field suggest 
that the prospects for such an endeavour are not very favourable. Econometric research 
depicts federalism and decentralisation as stumbling blocks for the emergence of big 
government in general and a generous welfare state in particular (cf. Cameron 1978; 
Hicks/Swank 1992; Schmidt 1997; Castles 1999; Huber/Stephens 2001; Swank 2002; 
Cusack/Fuchs 2003; Ravishankar 2004): “In fact, one might point to the federal-
ism/social policy linkage as one of the very few areas of unanimity in the literature, 
with writers from all the main competing explanatory paradigms arguing that federal 
institutions are inimical to high levels of social spending” (Castles 1998: 82).   
The two main explanatory paradigms focussing on public policy outcomes in territo-
rially fragmented polities are theories of fiscal federalism and various strands of politi-
cal institutionalism. The first group of theories derives from economic reasoning and 
argues that federalism is a significant institutional constraint on government growth. 
The size of government declines as taxes and expenditures are decentralised (Hayek 
1976; Brennan/Buchanan 1980). The absence of interstate tariffs, the presence of the 
free movement of persons and capital between political units, and fiscal competition 
between constituent units are seen as having significant consequences for social policy 
development. In particular, competition between the constituent units makes it difficult 
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for sub-state units to introduce benefits that will transform them into ‘welfare magnets’ 
or to increase taxes that will lead to the flight of capital and tax-payers. 
Political institutionalism also provides powerful arguments that vertical power sepa-
ration is inimical to comprehensive social policies. A first argument emphasises indirect 
and long-term effects of federalism on the political economy and its actors. Federalism 
indirectly influences welfare states by affecting a broad array of other socio-economic 
and political variables that, in turn, affect trajectories of welfare state development. 
Federalism is founded on and generates diversity, encouraging the emergence of territo-
rially diverse political economies, each with its own set of deeply rooted political inter-
ests and values. Swank (2002) for example notes that dispersion of policy-making au-
thority diminishes the size of political interests, undermines their unity and the coher-
ence of their strategies, and reduces the availability of conventional political resources. 
Federalism thus modifies the political capacities and power resources of key actors such 
as parties, unions and business organisations, undercuts the formation of national policy 
strategies and makes the formation of powerful welfare state alliances more difficult.  
A second line of institutional reasoning maintains that the institutional safeguards of 
the federal settlement, including bicameralism, referendum procedures and constitu-
tional courts, involves an inherent and highly pronounced vertical separation of powers 
(Lijphart 1999: 186). However, such separation of powers necessarily creates a prolif-
eration veto players and, hence, is a barrier to policy change (Tsebelis 2002). 
A third kind of argument stems from the fact that federal systems are necessarily, to 
some extent, joint-decision systems, i.e. ‘constellations in which parties are either 
physically or legally unable to reach their purposes through unilateral action and in 
which joint action depends on the (nearly) unanimous agreement of all parties involved’ 
(Scharpf 1997: 143). Thus, from a procedural perspective, altering the status quo in ter-
ritorially fragmented political systems requires the co-ordination of fragmented re-
sources of action. Since federal systems inflate the number of actors involved in the 
policy-making process (Pierson 1995: 455), and because sub-governments frequently 
pursue their own strategies in a given policy field, any major policy change requires the 
co-ordination of multi-layered interests and the approval of a host of actors who have to 
bargain until they agree on a joint course of action and—especially important for social 
policy—on the cost-sharing associated with this course. A joint course of action is par-
ticularly difficult to realise if the number of constituent units is high and if deep ethnic, 
political and socio-economic cleavages exist. If decisions in intertwined systems of de-
cision-making require the consent of sub-governments by means of super-majority or 
even unanimity requirements, then it is likely that a joint decision trap will occur, result-
ing in policy stalemate, sub-optimal policy outcomes and lowest-common-denominator 
policies (Scharpf 1985).  
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Finally, a fourth institutional line of reasoning focuses on the ways in which path de-
pendency and policy pre-emption limit the scope for subsequent policy change (Pierson 
2004). Taking theories of path dependence seriously requires us to turn back to history 
and examine forms and patterns of early policy pre-emption. It is not only important to 
identify when such initiatives occurred, but also which tier of government was first in 
taking them. Hence, the initial jurisdictional arrangements of federal states in social and 
fiscal policy may be seen as having structured and channelled the trajectories of their 
subsequent welfare state development. It is, for instance, very likely that policy pre-
emption by lower tiers of government may hamper the centralisation of social policy in 
subsequent years. 
Although the main thrust of the theoretical speculation in this area has strongly rein-
forced the view that federalism is inimical to welfare state development, an institutional 
approach does not predetermine such a conclusion. Given certain institutional configu-
rations and actor constellations, federalism also may function as a welfare state catalyst 
or be policy-neutral. With respect to fiscal competition, for example, much depends on 
the design of the tax system, the taxing powers conferred on sub-governments and the 
system of fiscal equalisation between different tiers of government (Oates 1999). If sub-
state governments’ budgets are funded by revenue-sharing or by intergovernmental 
grants, they have a strong incentive to ‘overfish’ common pool resources, since horizon-
tal tax competition is undermined and sub-governments can exploit resources collected 
at other tiers of government (Rodden 2003). Under these circumstances, decentralisation 
may even stimulate the size of the public sector. Another source for such an effect might 
be policy experiments undertaken by lower tiers of governments associated with spill-
over effects to the federal tier or horizontally to tiers at the same level (‘races to the top 
or the middle ground’) and with competitive innovation by different tiers of govern-
ment. Finally, a braking effect of federalism is much less likely to occur in settings whe-
re the central state has pre-empted the policy field from an early date.  
Hence, from a theoretical vantage point, the potential effects of federalism on welfa-
re state development are indeterminate. There is, moreover, strong evidence that such 
effects are neither invariant across space nor time.  Different federal setups operate in 
different ways and they operate differently at different stages of welfare state develop-
ment. Like other institutional effects, they are contingent on institutional configurations, 
actor constellations, actor orientations and on a broad range of contextual parameters. In 
particular, they may depend on specific 
¾ jurisdictional splits and fiscal transfer arrangements, 
¾ veto points, i.e. the secondary institutions of federalism, 
¾ characteristics of the welfare clientele, e.g. whether beneficiaries are viewed as 
deserving and whether they are well-organised and geographically concentrated, 
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¾ policy feedbacks, including effects on clientele organisation and power re-
sources, 
¾ the government’s budgetary situation, and 
¾ partisan configurations, the nature of the party system, the power of the interest 
organisations of labour and capital and the institutionalised interaction between 
them.  
Given this contingency of outcomes, the concrete impact of federalism on social policy 
has to be analysed empirically. As already mentioned, the econometric evidence is com-
pelling and strongly backs the hypothesis that vertical fragmentation of powers reins in 
big government. However, macro-quantitative cross-unit studies report average effects, 
but do not tell us much about the causal mechanisms by which such effects are genera-
ted in specific cases (Gerring 2004). Moreover, the role of sequencing, complex interac-
tions between independent variables, critical junctures and contextual parameters cannot 
be identified by such an approach (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003).  However, this is 
precisely where case studies and small-N comparisons have a real value in revealing the 
complexity of particular chains of causation and what they do and do not have in com-
mon. This then was the impetus and rationale for a major collaborative research endea-
vour designed to produce a qualitative and historically nuanced account of welfare state 
development in six European and New World federations. Relying on case studies, writ-
ten by leading  scholars from each of these nations, our intention was to locate the me-
chanisms by which vertical power separation has influenced the dynamics of social pro-
gramme development over a period of more than 120 years and to identify how, in turn, 
the development of the welfare state has impacted back on the institutions of federal 
government in these nations. In the next section, we summarise core findings of this 
comparative analysis and continue then by applying these findings to the contemporary 
circumstances of the European Union. 
2.  THE DEVELOPMENTAL DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
IN SIX FEDERAL STATES: TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP 
Our findings with respect to the early consolidation stage of the welfare state suggest 
that types of federalism as well as political regime types are pertinent to the develop-
mental trajectory of welfare states. In all those federations which have been democratic 
throughout the course of the twentieth century and where the type of federal arrange-
ment was initially based on a policy-related separation of powers (interstate or dual fed-
eralism), welfare state consolidation took place later and the pace of social expenditure 
growth was slower than in the majority of unitary states at a comparable level of eco-
nomic development. Austrian and German development was quite different.  These 
countries were welfare state pioneers, but their early social policy consolidation oc-
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curred under non-democratic auspices. They were, moreover, nations whose federal 
arrangements showed a strong leaning toward intra-state or co-operative federalism 
from the outset. 
By identifying democratic federalism as a major impediment at the formative phase 
of welfare state development, our main findings dovetails neatly with the evidence from 
comparative statistical research. It was democratic federations that were in the majority, 
and it is their retarding effect on programme adoption, and, hence, on the initial stages 
of programme expenditure growth, that has been picked up in the statistical studies. 
However, in contradistinction to the necessarily undifferentiated conclusions of such 
studies, our historical, ideographic approach allows us to locate the precise circumstan-
ces under which federalism matters and to identify the underlying mechanisms explai-
ning why federalism has been an impediment in some contexts and not in others. 
A key consideration in these differential dynamics of federal welfare states is the 
question of which tier of government first occupied the welfare state terrain. Of central 
importance, therefore, is the original distribution of jurisdictions among levels of gov-
ernment. The programme impeding and expenditure restraining effects of federalism 
can be seen most clearly in democratic federations with interstate federal arrangements, 
where the federal level of government originally had little or no power to take up social 
policy concerns and the scope for federal fiscal manoeuvre was relatively limited. In 
such instances, the take-off of the welfare state was delayed until the necessary powers 
had been acquired. Because they either lacked or shared social and fiscal policy compe-
tencies, federal authorities could not act unilaterally but only in collaboration with the 
constituent units.  
This meant that social policy frequently got stuck in a kind of jurisdictional game of 
hide-and-seek: While the federal level lacked the power to launch national social pro-
grammes, constituent units were often hesitant to establish welfare programmes unilat-
erally as they feared the competitive disadvantage of pioneer status. Such considerations 
were of particular relevance in North America in the period prior to the Great Depres-
sion and were further strengthened by the complete absence or weak development of 
systems of fiscal equalisation. Although fiscal equalisation was a stronger theme in 
Australian institutional development, the inter-war failure to initiate a scheme of child 
endowment was a classical instance of jurisdictional hide-and-seek. On the other hand, 
there were also instances where constituent units and municipalities established social 
programmes at the local and regional level. Swiss federalism with its emphasis on local 
autonomy rather than horizontal competition is a clear case in point. Here, local policy 
pre-emption has not only delayed programme adoption at the federal level, but has also 
reduced the degrees of freedom available for future federal social policy initiatives by 
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reducing the capacity of the federal government to penetrate locally grown social pro-
grammes. 
As a consequence of limited federal powers and local policy pre-emption, welfare 
state consolidation took place from the bottom up in all the democratic federations. 
Prompt upward redistribution of competencies was blocked through a series of institu-
tional veto points, with the multi-tiered negotiations required to remove such obstacles 
necessarily involving a considerable number of actors with often conflicting interests. 
Rigid procedures of constitutional amendment and judicial review have repeatedly 
struck down federal intrusions in social affairs. In cases where a reallocation of jurisdic-
tions was unsuccessful, the only way for the federal government to launch social policy 
initiatives was to provide federal grants to the constituent units of the federation.  
Processes of these kinds were largely absent in Germany and Austria. Neither 
country was a fully developed democracy until 1918 and judicial review was unknown. 
Moreover, the constitutional system of the Habsburg Empire was, at best, proto-federal 
in character. Early and comprehensive policy pre-emption of the welfare state at the 
central level in both countries was the major reason for unhindered and speedy social 
policy expansion in the years thereafter. Several contextual factors accelerated welfare 
state consolidation under both monarchies. An important factor was the legitimacy re-
quirement of a conservative elite that found itself confronted with a growing working 
class movement demanding more extensive political participation. Moreover, the 
contribution-based funding of programmes provided a mechanism for continued welfare 
state growth, given that fiscal conflicts between different levels of government could be 
neatly sidestepped by externalising costs to employers and employees through the para-
fiscal mechanisms of the social insurance system. Moreover, a political culture of state-
centred reform embedded in an ‘enlightened’ absolutism sustained a ‘top-down’ welfare 
state reform pattern. Finally, these early welfare state building initiatives were aspects 
of state and nation-building processes, making social policy a catalyst for the reinfor-
cement of unitary trends in political and administrative development. In Germany, after 
1871, social insurance policy became an important instrument for the consolidation of 
the new Reich. Nation-building was also important in the Habsburg Empire, since the 
emergence of welfare institutions was seen as a means of countering the strong centri-
fugal forces in a multi-ethnic empire.  
In consequence, a great gulf already separated Germany and Austria from the democ-
ratic federalist welfare state laggards by the late 1920s. In the former, welfare state con-
solidation was largely accomplished, while, in the latter, it had, in respect of the vast 
majority of programmes, yet to begin. Over the next two decades, external shocks—
economic depression and total war—influenced social policy development in both types 
of federal setting, but in ways that reflected their prior contexts of development. In the 
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long-time democratic federations, external shocks provided an impetus for overcoming 
entrenched veto-point opposition, especially where the party in office was one favouring 
reform. In the United States, economic crisis was the major catalyst of change. In Aus-
tralia, the wartime crisis provided the occasion for centralisation of the tax system and 
an extension of the social services role of the Commonwealth, with the longest Labour 
administration since Federation as its agent. In Canada, despite the lack of a left party 
impetus, wartime conditions had very similar effects. Even in neutral Switzerland, 
World War Two was a major catalyst for expanding the social and fiscal powers of the 
federal government. Thus, by the mid-1940s, basic competencies for a major federal 
role in social policy were substantially developed in all these countries 
After the war, once a full array of programmes was in place, and democratic institu-
tions were fully developed, the welfare state became an important source of credit 
claiming and partisan competition. Hence, the partisan complexion of government was 
the primary factor shaping the trajectory of social expenditure growth in the post-war 
period. However, the way in which party politics was played out continued to be 
strongly influenced by the character of governmental (and federal) institutions. Canada 
is a case in point because the country’s social programmes are embedded in and gov-
erned by different forms of intergovernmental relations (Banting 2004). Political grid-
lock was most pronounced in the field of contributory pensions where policy making is 
based on joint-decision federalism and framed by a vertically incongruent party system. 
It was almost completely absent where a classical division of powers prevailed as was, 
for instance, the case in respect of unemployment benefits. Moreover, different policy 
instruments—social insurance, means-testing and universalism—have diverse potentials 
for expenditure growth, and particular policy strategies chosen in the past have a path 
dependent impact on the policy options favoured in the here and now.  
In addition, governments have learnt to cope with the institutionally inbuilt complex-
ity of federal arrangements and have increasingly relied on bypass strategies. The emer-
gence of such mechanisms results from a functional problem of all evolving democratic 
federal systems in the modern era: how to get around inbuilt constitutional rigidities to 
institute and deliver the welfare programmes and reforms demanded by democratic 
electorates. Federal constitutions are deliberately designed to inhibit change or, at least, 
to slow down changes which alter the balance of power and responsibility between state 
and federal jurisdictions. Thus, those who seek to affect change must find a way around 
existing institutional barriers. In our research, we identify three bypass strategies, which 
differ from federation to federation (see table 1). These bypass strategies have not only 
influenced patterns of benefits provision but have also channelled and shaped the pub-
lic-private mix in social policy over the long term.  
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Table 1: Bypass structures in six OECD-federations 
Bypass Description Exemplary 
countries 
Patchwork 
 quilt 
An array of discrete agreements between federal and state authorities 
gives lower tiers of government control over aspects of social policy 
initiation and implementation, while compelling them to carry out na-
tional programmes. One important route to overcome lacking federal 
social policy competencies was to rely on the federal spending power 
for providing grants to subordinate governments but increasingly also 
to employers and employees. Going beyond some conceptions of fed-
eralism, where each program is run and financed by a single level of 
government, the patchwork quilt may be based on joint decisions, 
whereby agreements require approval by both levels of government, or 
run on a shared-costs basis, with the federal government simply pro-
viding financial support for multi-tier programmes.  
Canada, 
USA 
Regulatory 
The state mandates private parties to pay for and provide certain bene-
fits, such as pensions, health care, etc. Most regulation concerns em-
ployers’ provisions to employees. Mandates may be hard (binding) or 
soft (optional). In the latter case, the effectiveness of regulation is de-
pendent on the largesse of tax deductions or subsidies. In Australia the 
federal arbitration system used its power to control wages in order to 
provide a social policy minimum, and, thus, in principle, removed the 
need for specific poverty alleviation measures. It also served as the 
legal authority for providing mandated benefits such as sickness ex-
penditure and, initially, second-tier pensions and in the process not 
merely bypassed the states and federation as providers of benefits, but 
also the federal executive and legislature as makers of social policy 
decisions.  
Australia, 
Switzerland
Para- f i s c a l  
(or, when fully 
developed 
para- s t a t e )  
Multi-level governance problems were avoided by creating a new sub-
level (the parafiscus), regularly also spun off organisationally, creating 
new exit options for offloading costs from the state or federal level to 
the parafiscal level. Hence institutionalized independent public agen-
cies, mandated by the state but with their own tax base (contributions) 
outside of the state’s general budget (para-fiscus), manage the delivery 
of benefits. These agencies, in addition, often have an independent 
power base of employer associations and unions, with state representa-
tives from various levels of federalism serving as arbiters between and 
amongst the ‘social partners’. In its most fully developed form, with 
almost half of public finances dedicated to the para-fiscus, independent 
agencies are so pervasive they form an effective para-state. 
Austria, 
Germany  
 
To sum up, a comparative analysis of Western federal states shows that two dimensions 
of distributional conflict interact when federalism meets the welfare state, namely (1) 
the (re)distribution of (mostly) money between social classes (and regions), and (2) the 
distribution of power between tiers of government. The consolidation of the welfare 
state in these six federations was mainly determined by the extent to which the distribu-
tion of power allowed social policy to unfold and that was driven by how conflictual 
these politics were. Two aspects seem crucial here: on the one hand, the level of democ-
ratic development at the time the welfare state emerged and, on the other, the type of 
federalism dictated by constitutional arrangements. Intra-state (cooperative) federalism 
allows federal level social policy to flourish early on, whereas inter-state (dual) federa-
lism tends to protect the political status quo, and, thus, to retard welfare state growth. 
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These institutional factors have been overlaid by social interest patterns: if there were 
fewer regional cleavages—in the party system and the economy—it was much easier to 
nationalize power than where regionalism was strong or where there was substantial 
ethnic or economic fragmentation. We now draw on these conclusions to identify the 
dynamics of European social policy development and to evaluate the prospects for a 
European welfare state.   
3.  LESSONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Politically, the situation in the EU has some resemblances to conditions in Germany and 
Austria in the late 19th century. Though the EU is clearly not an autocratic regime1, most 
scholars, agree that Europe suffers from a democratic deficit. Just as in the Germanic 
federations in the late 19th Century, improving internal cohesion and creating a common 
identity are core contemporary issues in the EU. Moreover, and with clears parallels to 
the Habsburg monarchy, the Union is highly fragmented in both national and economic 
terms and therefore in need of a strengthening of integrative and centripetal forces. 
Hence, expanding common social policy beyond the level already achieved (cf. for an 
overview Leibfried/Pierson 1995, 2004; Falkner 1998; Geyer 2001) might, amongst 
other things, be considered an strategy for reinforcing a European identity and improv-
ing the output-legitimation of EU institutions. A common social policy would also assist 
in overcoming the “constitutional asymmetry” between policies promoting market effi-
ciencies and policies promoting social protection and equality (Scharpf 2002). Without 
such policies, it is seems quite probable that the forces unleashed by negative integra-
tion will induce a competitive downward spiral in benefit provision at the Member State 
level, in turn, weakening the cohesion of the Union in the long run. 
However, while Imperial Germany and Austria found it relatively easy to launch so-
cial policy from the top down, the situation of contemporary Europe is unique in several 
respects, making a federal European welfare state a rather unlikely prospect. In order to 
develop the logic of this argument further, we apply our findings with respect to welfare 
state formation in six federations to the contemporary circumstances of the European 
Union. Specifically, we discuss the explanatory factors we have identified as influenc-
ing social policy development in federal states, showing how they help us to explain 
previous and contemporary patterns of EU social policy.  
                                                 
1  Late 19th century Germany had some proto-democratic features, most notably universal manhood suffrage for the 
Lower House of parliament.  Imperial Austria, with a franchise restricted to 9 per cent of the adult population, did 
not. 
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3.1 Policy pre-emption 
In contrast to the six federations examined in our study, the social policy terrain in Eu-
rope is comprehensively pre-empted by the Member States. Historically, the develop-
ment of the welfare state in Europe was intimately connected with the emergence of the 
modern nation state (Flora 1986). From the outset, solidarity and legitimation issues 
were strongly related to the concept of the nation. One, perhaps overly cynical, view of 
the welfare state is to see it as a device for redistributing money between people sharing 
a common language and similar cultural norms. In the context of heterogeneous socie-
ties, however, it has been argued that ethnicity and territorial differences have constitu-
ted more limited and spatially separated entities of solidarity, potentially impeding the 
emergence of a comprehensive and redistributive welfare state at the national level. In a 
similar vein, it can be argued that contemporary Europe is characterised by territorially 
fragmented spaces of solidarity with default lines running along the borders between the 
Member States, thereby limiting the chances of supplementing much less replacing na-
tional social programmes with uniform community wide schemes. Moreover, within 
Europe, the nation-based welfare state remains a powerful source of legitimation for 
national governments. Since we know from many surveys that the welfare state is 
extremely popular amongst European mass electorates, both citizens and the govern-
ments of the Member States are likely to resist any transfer of social policy related po-
wers. For instance, Eurobarometer data, mapping the preferences of citizens in the 
EU15 Member States with regard to their preferred locus of social policy making, sug-
gest that only about one third of the population supports a shift of social policy jurisdic-
tion to the Union (Mau 2003: 311).  
It would therefore appear to be the case that welfare state building in Europe is sub-
ject to intrinsically similar constraints as those governing competitive state-building in 
Canada (Banting 1995). As the dispute between Ottawa and Quebec over the authority 
in social policy-making reveals, legitimation issues can lead to severe tensions over the 
locus of benefit provision. However, the popularity of national welfare states creates a 
powerful status quo bias. In terms of welfare regime patterns, social policy pre-emption 
at the nation state level has created a patch-work quilt that has become increasingly By-
zantine during the several waves of European enlargement (Scharpf 2002). Since the 
recent Eastern enlargement, no less than five different welfare regimes can be distingu-
ished in contemporary Europe, which differ in respect of funding principles, forms and 
levels of benefit supplied and degrees of inclusiveness, thereby reflecting the different 
political power constellations and national policy legacies from which they have emer-
ged. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to conclude that the window of oppor-
tunity for the supersession of national social programmes by European schemes has 
diminished with each successive wave of enlargement, because each increase in mem-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 16) 
- 12 - 
bership has multiplied the number of the constituent units and thereby increased the 
number of potential veto players potentially opposed to greater uniformity of provision.  
Apart from the interests of the Member States in retaining their own powers and in 
enhancing their own legitimacy, a broad array of private interests have crystallised 
around the existing social programmes in the Member States. As a result, the policy 
status quo is generally defended not only by national governments but also by en-
trenched interests, such as the medical profession. As Scharpf (2002: 651) points out, 
“German doctors and patients would unite in protest against any moves toward a Brit-
ish-style National Health Service”. Again, important lessons can be learnt from welfare 
state development in federal nation states. In particular, the Swiss experience demon-
strates the mechanisms through which local policy pre-emption and the vested interests 
surrounding these programmes constrain the ability of the central government to enact 
uniform and redistributive social policy. Given the Swiss federation’s initial lack of 
powers in the latter half of the 19th Century, the impact of industrialisation was first 
encountered at municipal and cantonal level, giving an impetus to local schemes and the 
emergence of a heterogeneous web of local social security arrangements. Using the nu-
merous veto points enshrined in the Swiss constitution, local programme carriers, busi-
ness and regional interests were able, in the short to medium-term, to fend off the intru-
sion of the federal government in social affairs. As a consequence, federal social pro-
grammes were either delayed or structurally pre-configured by locally adopted solutions 
or the federal government had to limit its role to the provision of subsidies to these pro-
grammes. Frequently, moreover, the federal government was only capable of enacting 
framework legislation stipulating minimum social standards. Sometimes, it was con-
strained from action of any sort. 
The lesson to be drawn is that the interplay between policy pre-emption, entrenched 
interests and institutional veto points is an important key to understanding the dynamics 
of welfare state building in multi-level systems. The more comprehensive is the policy 
space pre-empted by lower tiers of government and the more veto points are available, 
the less likely it is that jurisdictional competencies will be reallocated between different 
levels of government or that uniform policy solutions will be adopted. These are the 
circumstances currently prevalent within the EU. Not only are social policies fully deve-
loped at the level of the Member States, but vested interests and national governments 
also face extraordinarily favourable opportunities to defend the status quo. As we point 
out in the next section, the institutional rigidities and high thresholds of consensus ne-
cessary to alter the status quo built into the European multi-level system provide power-
ful leverage for countering moves towards European welfare state development. 
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3.2.  Policy jurisdiction and institutional rigidities 
The comparison of OECD federations has revealed that the initial distribution of powers 
between different levels of government and the institutional checks and balances ensh-
rined in their constitutions have substantially impeded policy reform. This was particu-
larly true for interstate federal arrangements based on a policy-related separation of po-
wers. In order, then, to ascertain the prospects for a European welfare state one obvious 
step is to examine the social policy related powers as they are spelled out by the Euro-
pean Treaties. This analysis is to be found in Table 2, which identifies the assignment of 
explicit social policy mandates in EU treaty documents from the Treaty of Rome to the 
Rome (II) Constitutional Treaty of 2004.  
Table 2:  The assignment of explicita social policy mandates to the European Union 
from the Treaty of Rome to the Rome (II) Constitutional Treaty. 
 
European 
Economic 
Commu-
nity 
Single 
European 
Act 
(SEA) 
Maas-
tricht 
Treaty 
Social 
Protocol 
Amsterdam 
Treaty Nice Treaty 
Rome (II) 
Constitu-
tional 
Treaty 
EEC EEC EC-MT SP EC-AT EC-NT EC-CT 
Field of mandate 
1957 (1958) 1986 (1987) 1992 (1993) 1992 (1993) 1997 (1999) 2000 (2003) 2004 (?) 
Discrimination on 
grounds of nationality 
Unan 
7 No ref 
QMV 
6 No ref 
QMV 
12 
QMV 
12 
QMV III-
123 
Other antidiscrimi-
nation measures, har-
monization excluded 
No ref No ref No ref No ref QMV 13 (2) 
QMV 
13 (2) 
QMV III-
124 (2) 
Free labour movement Unan 48-50 
QMV 
48-50 
QMV 
48-50 No impact 
QMV 
39-40 
QMV 
39-40 
QMV III-
133-134 
Gender equality  
in payb 
(Unan) 
119 
(Unan) 
119 
(Unan) 
119 
(Unan) 
6 
QMV 
141 QMV 141 
QMV III-
214 
Gender equality  
for labour forceb No ref No ref No ref 
QMV 
2 (1) v 
QMV 
137 (1) v 
QMV 137 (1) 
i 
QMV III-
210 (1) i]  
Working environment No ref. QMV 118° QMV 118a 
QMV 
2 (1) i 
QMV 
137 (1) i 
QMV 137 (1) 
a 
QMV III-
210 (1) a 
Working conditions 
(outside former Art. 
118a, line 6) 
No ref No ref No ref QMV 2 (1) ii 
QMV 
137 (1) ii 
QMV 137 (1) 
b 
QMV III-
210 (1) b 
Worker information 
and consultation No ref No ref No ref 
QMV 
2 (1) iii 
QMV 
137 (1) iii 
QMV 137 
(1)e 
QMV III-
210 (1) e 
Integration of persons 
excluded from labour 
marketc 
No ref No ref No ref QMV 2 (1) iv 
QMV 
137 (1) iv 
QMV 137 (1) 
h 
QMV III-
210 (1) h 
Combating of social 
exclusion No ref No ref No ref No ref No ref. 
QMV 137 (1) 
j 
QMV III-
210 (1) j 
Modernisation of social 
protection systems No ref No ref No ref No ref No ref. 
QMV 137 (1) 
k 
QMV III-
210 (1) k 
Public Health No ref No ref QMV 129 No ref 
QMV 
152 
QMV 
152 
QMV III-
278 
Social security coordi-
nation 
Unan 
51 
Unan 
51 
Unan 
51 n. a. 
Unan 
42 
Unan 
42 
QMV III-
136 
(but see III-
136 (2)) 
Harmonization of other 
antidiscrimination 
measures (see line 2)d 
No ref No ref No ref No ref Unan 13 (1) 
Unan 
13 (1) 
Unan III-
124 (1) 
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European 
Economic 
Commu-
nity 
Single 
European 
Act 
(SEA) 
Maas-
tricht 
Treaty 
Social 
Protocol 
Amsterdam 
Treaty Nice Treaty 
Rome (II) 
Constitu-
tional 
Treaty 
EEC EEC EC-MT SP EC-AT EC-NT EC-CT 
Field of mandate 
1957 (1958) 1986 (1987) 1992 (1993) 1992 (1993) 1997 (1999) 2000 (2003) 2004 (?) 
Social security and 
protection of workers No ref No ref No ref 
Unan 
2 (3) i 
Unan 
137 (3) i 
Unan  
137 (1) c 
Unan III-
210 (1) c 
Protection of workers 
(employment contract 
termination) 
No ref No ref No ref Unan 2 (3) ii 
Unan 
137 (3) ii 
Unan  
137 (1) d 
Unan III-
210 (1) d 
Collective interest 
representation, code-
termination 
No ref No ref No ref Unan 2 (3) iii 
Unan 
137 (3) iii 
Unan 
137 (1) f 
Unan III-
210 (1) f 
Employment of third-
country nationals No ref No ref No ref 
Unan 
2 (3) iv 
Unan 
137 (3) iv 
Unan  
137 (1) g 
Unan III-
210 (1) g 
Funding for employ-
ment policyc No ref No ref No ref 
Unan 
2 (3) v 
Unan 
137 (3) v No ref No ref. 
Pay No ref No ref e No ref. in 100a (2)e 
Excl in 
2 (6) 
Excl 
137 (6) 
Excl 
137 (5) 
Excl III 210 
(6) 
Right of association No ref No ref e No ref. in 100a (2)e 
Excl in 
2 (6) 
Excl 
137 (6) 
Excl 
137 (5) 
Excl III-210 
(6) 
Right to strike and to 
impose lock-outs No ref No ref 
e No ref in 100a (2)e 
Excl in 
2 (6) 
Excl 
137 (6) 
Excl  
137 (5) 
Excl III-210 
(6) 
Employment (128) 140f (128) 140f III-213 a 
Labour market and working conditions  140 III-213 b 
Professional education and training  140 III-213 c 
Social security  140 III-213 d 
Prevention of occupational accidents and diseases  140 III-213 e 
Protection of health at work  140 III-213 f 
Mandates for the 
 
Open 
Method of 
Coordinationg 
 
(OMC) 
Law of coalitions and collective agreements between 
employers and employees  140 III-213 g 
Notes:  
Years given for treaties refer to the signing and (in parentheses) the ratification of the Treaty. Numbers listed in the 
table refer to articles in each treaty. 
Abbreviations used: Unan = unanimity required; QMV = qualified majority voting; No ref = no reference to mandate; 
n. a. = not applicable; Excl = mandate explicitly excluded. 
Heavier shading denotes weaker mandate. Heaviest shading shows explicit denial of mandates, anchored in the trea-
ties only since 1992 in these areas. 
a  As a rule the table refers to explicit powers mentioned in the treaties, in contrast to unspecified general powers, as 
under Articles 100 and 235 EEC (since AT 95 and 308 EC) or to non-enabling norms (on an exception see note b and 
note d, para. 2). 
b  Between the original Treaty of Rome and the 1992 Social Protocol the ECJ had interpreted gender equality more 
and more widely. Article 119 EEC (since AT 141 EC) contained no express enabling clause; respective Directives 
were based on Article 100 or 235 EEC which required unanimous decisions. In the end AT Article 141 (3) EC in 
1997 brought the first special mandate and QMV. 
c  From 1992 to 1997 this QMV-mandate excluded the one for funding, where unanimity was required according to 
Article 2 (3) v (Social Protocol) and then AT Article 137 (3) EC, thus maintaining anti-poverty spending programmes 
as highly veto prone. 
d  On top of the original two anti-discrimination Articles—gender (equality in pay only; Article 119 EEC, see table 
lines 4, 5 [and note b], and since AT generally prohibiting any discrimination based on ‘sex’ see lines 2 and 14) and 
nationality (Article 7 EEC, QMV; see line 1)—dating already to 1957, AT Article 13 EC in 1997 silently added seven 
new anti-discrimination categories: racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, and age or sexual orientation. 
These nine categories are picked up in lines 1, 2 and 14 of the table. 
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Article 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights—identical with the Draft CT Article II-81—includes the 
above and adds nine novel categories: colour, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, and disability. Altogether these eighteen categories of anti-
discrimination serve as examples only (‘on any ground such as’) when the 2004 CT becomes law. But CT Article II-
81 does not give the EU a special regulatory mandate (and see Articles II-111-114). However, as the case of gender 
equality has shown, these nine categories of EU primary law, together with the open-ended thematic mandate, might 
produce an unforeseeable dynamics—especially with an ECJ that can rely on long and developed chains of anti-
discrimination precedents in nationality and gender (and seven new categories to be explored), with gender equality 
starting out from just that un-mandated situation in 1957 (see note b). 
e  From 1986 to 1997 first SEA Article 100a EEC and then the MT Article 100a (2) EC exempted provisions on 
taxes, free movement of persons, and on the rights and interests of employees from QMV, but did not preclude action 
by unanimity, whereas Article 2 (6) of the Social Protocol and the later AT/NT Article 137 (6) EC specifically with-
holds mandates on pay etc. as such. 
f  Article 128 (2) EC in the new 1997 AT Employment Chapter (Articles 125-130 EC) already spoke of ‘guidelines’ 
and AT Article 140 EC provided a loose mandate only, with the situation in public health being similarly opaque (see 
Article 152 (2) versus (4)). The full materialisation of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) took much longer, 
and evolved in the main extra-constitutionally, until picked up in 2004 by Article III-213 Draft CT, where OMC-
instruments of the Commission are specified in the second paragraph. Already in the 2001 NT the OMC subject areas 
are listed as examples, allowing an extension of OMC to many other like fields. 
g  The term ‘Open Method of Coordination’ is not mentioned in any of the Treaties. 
Source:  Leibfried (2004).   
An initial point to note is a crucial difference between the structuring of interstate fede-
ralism and the present framework of European institutions. With respect to social poli-
cy, the EU is a unique multi-tiered system, with three distinctive characteristics: a pro-
pensity towards ‘joint-decision traps’ and policy immobilism; a prominent role for 
courts in policy development; and an unusually tight coupling to market-conforming 
processes (Leibfried 2004). In a manner similar to the democratic federal states, the EC 
initially had no social policy mandate of any kind. However, it has acquired a conside-
rable range of social policy related competencies over the past two decades. Moreover, 
barriers to social policy decision making have been relaxed as Qualified Majority Vo-
ting (QMV) have been extended to an increasing number of jurisdictions (see table 2). 
Despite such changes, what distinguishes the EU from the situation of the federal nation 
states is that decision making at the central level still requires supermajorities and thus 
an unusually high level of consensus among the Member States. Political deadlock the-
refore does not primarily emerge from a lack of policy authority, but rather from the 
rigid and vertically intertwined decision-making rules built into Europe’s system of 
multi-level governance  (Scharpf 1985). 
This fundamental barrier to progress has not been substantially altered by the recent 
enhancement of QMV, since changes to core branches of social policy such as social 
security still require unanimity. Moreover, a new provision adopted by the Treaty of 
Nice rules out any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States (Art. 
137 [2] (a)).  Instead, the Council may, by means of directives, adopt “minimum re-
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quirements for gradual implementation” but such directives shall avoid imposing ad-
ministrative, financial and legal constraints that may impede the creation and develop-
ment of small and medium-sized undertakings. In addition to these constraints, direc-
tives intended to enact minimum standards in the realm of social security still require 
unanimity.   
Also related to the allocation of powers is the question of whether the centre is fis-
cally and administratively capable of formulating positive social policy and building a 
redistributive welfare state. Compared with other ‘multi-tiered’ systems, the EU’s social 
policy-making apparatus is extremely bottom-heavy (Kleinman/Piachaud 1992a; Pier-
son/Leibfried 1995; Kleinman 2001). Moreover, the centre is extraordinarily weak in 
fiscal matters, as it lacks the power to levy taxes and therefore entirely depends on the 
transfer payments of the national governments. Seen from a historical perspective, how-
ever, the administrative and fiscal weakness of the European centre has analogies with 
the situation of the U.S and Switzerland in the 19th century. 
A second distinctive characteristic of the EU is that the role of courts differs from 
that in the six federal states featuring in our research. Whereas in the latter, the general 
trend of early court judgements was to limit federal social policy initiatives and thus 
protect the policy autonomy of the constituent units at the expense of nation-wide social 
programmes, ECJ activism related to economic integration has undercut the sovereignty 
and policy autonomy of sub-governments. It is widely acknowledged that the ECJ has 
been a key actor unleashing the forces of negative integration. In other words, the proc-
ess of market building and its backing by the ECJ has put national welfare states under 
heavy strain, but these pressures have not been addressed by efforts to re-regulate 
through the further development of policy at the centre.  
This leads to the question of why the centre has remained so inactive with respect to 
redistributive social programmes. So far we have pointed to the status quo bias resulting 
from policy pre-emption at the national level, to fiscal and administrative shortcomings 
and to rigid decision-making rules providing Member States with strong veto powers. 
Now we turn to the reasons why the supermajorities required for changing the status 
quo are most unlikely to occur. To this end, it is necessary to examine the political and 
economic cleavages characterizing contemporary Europe and to map out associated 
patterns of interest formation. 
3.3.  Political and economic cleavages 
Tsebelis’ veto player theory suggests that it is not sufficient to focus on the number of 
veto players alone. His core axioms for explaining policy change also refer to the im-
portance of the ideological distance between veto players and their internal cohesion. 
This suggests that we need to focus on the partisan complexion of member states’ go-
vernments and their cohesion if we wish to understand political cleavages in the Euro-
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pean Council. Manow et al. (2004: 13-14) have recently shown not only that Europe has 
become increasingly politically heterogeneous over time, but have also convincingly 
argued that a knowledge of partisan complexion of national governments is important 
for understanding the dynamics of EU social policy over time. Just as was the case in 
respect of the increasing pluralism of welfare regimes patterns over the past forty years, 
this increasing political fragmentation has occurred in the wake of the several waves of 
enlargement. Today, the European political landscape reflects the full spectrum of ideo-
logical positions, ranging from Swedish-style social democracy on the one hand, to se-
cular conservative and right-wing nationalist parties on the other. Although there has 
been a convergence of different party families with respect to attitudes toward the wel-
fare state and the market economy, differences remain that are likely to create tensions 
over social policy making both at the national and European level. The parties pro-
grammatically most inclined to pro-welfare state attitudes are not those most forcefully 
backing the integration process given that “support for integration quite strongly varies 
inversely with the ‘leftness’ of EU member-state governments” (Manow et al 2004: 13).  
However, there is some evidence that this trend is changing, as Eurosceptic leftist par-
ties have recently “become distinctly more pro-integration as regulated capitalism has 
come on the European agenda” (Hooghe et al 2004: 129). At the same time, rightist 
parties have also begun to selectively oppose European integration in order to avert re-
regulation at the European level. As a result, European issues related to redistribution 
have become more closely aligned to traditional conflicts between the left and right. 
Despite this being so, Europe’s national governments are now comprised of such a wi-
de, and still diverging, array of political parties and coalitions from across the left-right 
spectrum, that a cohesive policy action at the European level is most unlikely to emerge. 
With respect to internal cohesion, Tsebelis argues that policy stability increases with 
the internal homogeneity of collective veto players. Increasing cohesion is most likely 
to occur where national interests and territorially bounded values are at stake. A recent 
study of political conflict in Europe concludes that EU policies with strong distributio-
nal impacts across countries give rise to national coalitions (Marks 2004). Where legi-
timation issues, national values and topics related to financial obligations and the com-
petitive position of the economy are to the forefront of debate, it seems probable that 
cohesive forces will become much stronger. Under such circumstances, territorial, (i.e. 
national) interests may even outweigh ideology. We have already noted that the welfare 
state is a powerful source of output legitimation that is closely connected to the nation 
state and which, therefore, pre-configures strong national interests. The same holds true 
for vital economic issues. To underscore this argument, we briefly illustrate how the 
substantial economic differences among the EU countries create conflicting interest 
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patterns and describe the ways in which these conflicts diminish the possibility of chan-
ging the status quo.  
As shown in figures 1 and 2, economic cleavages within Europe are considerable. 
Figure 1 shows GDP per capita levels in Purchasing Power Standards relative to the EU 
25 average, while figure 2 shows a boxplot for the absolute levels of GDP per capita in 
US-Dollars. Figure 2 shows that, even when we exclude Luxembourg from the calcula-
tion, the range of the distribution (the difference between the poorest and the richest 
country) is higher than the average EU income level. Figure 1 shows that most of the 
former communist countries enjoy only 50-60 of EU average income. Countries like 
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, that are seeking to join the European Union in the near 
future, are even poorer, with current income levels of around 30 per cent of the Europe-
an average. 
Figure 1:  GDP per capita in 2003 in Purchasing Power Standards, EU25 = 100  
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Source: Eurostat: Statistics in Focus, Economy and Finance, 27/2004  
Figure 2:  GDP per capita in real international Dollars in 24 EU countries  
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Source: Penn World Table 6.1. Data refer to 2000 except Malta and Cyprus (= late 1990s). Luxembourg is excluded 
because GDP is overestimated. This boxplot displays the median, the range as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of 
the distribution of GDP per capita levels. 
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These huge differences in economic wealth are closely associated with conflicting eco-
nomic interest patterns. These interests differ systematically as between rich and poor 
Member States, making, tensions over social policy making and, in particular, welfare 
state funding, more likely. According to neoclassical growth theory, poor nations have a 
natural competitive advantage deriving from their status as economic laggards. Given 
capital shortage, low non-wage labour costs, free trade and capital movement, they be-
nefit from the influx of investment and jobs outsourced by the rich countries. To sustain 
this competitive advantage, governments and especially business organisations in the 
poorer countries obviously have no major interest in raising social standards. The situa-
tion in the rich Member States is precisely the opposite. Facing the competition of low-
wage economies with a well-educated labour force, they clearly have an interest in 
championing the uniform social standards imposed by the Union. At the same time, 
however, rich countries have an interest in avoiding the financial burden necessary to 
fund such efforts. Moreover, it is clear that this is a burden that has increased markedly 
in the wake of the most recent enlargement when only relatively poor countries had joi-
ned the EU. Nor is there any obvious prospect of the situation improving. Europe’s 
wealthiest countries, including Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, with GDP per capita 
exceeding mean income levels by 20 to 50 percent, hesitate to join the Union. 
But this is not the only reason why no common denominator can be achieved. Things 
are made even worse by the fact that preferences in favour of re-regulation at the Euro-
pean level appear to differ as between national populations and their governments. U-
sing Eurobarometer data, Mau (2003) has examined whether the populations of the 15 
EU Member States support a transfer of social policy responsibilities from the nation 
state to the European level. His findings show that attitudes towards European social 
policies are crucially influenced by welfare regime type and the level of social security 
hitherto achieved by Member States. Whereas citizens in the Nordic countries are oppo-
sed to an enlargement of EU social competencies, because they fear that uniform Euro-
pean social schemes will undercut the high standards of their advanced welfare states, 
citizens in southern Europe show a greater proclivity to expand the role of the European 
level in social affairs for precisely the opposite reason. Moreover, existing welfare re-
gimes also structure partisan dispositions toward European integration. Brinegar et al. 
(2004) find that, in redistributive welfare states, the left opposes further EU integration, 
whereas, in residual welfare states, it is the right that resists enhanced integration. Poli-
tical polarization over EU integration is less pronounced in conservative welfare re-
gimes. 
In sum, Europe is facing a fundamental social policy dilemma. Though Europe, initi-
ally lacked powers to establish social programmes of its own that could compete with 
those of Member States, it did undermine the policy autonomy and sovereignty of 
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Member States in social affairs in the process of developing a supranational supremacy 
in policies related to the establishment of a single market, a process also catalysed and 
protected by ECJ activism. To cope effectively with direct and indirect spill-over effects 
on national welfare states imposed by economic integration would, however, require 
concerted European-wide action on the positive integration front. However, given a 
fiscally and administratively weak centre and a set of veto players characterized by sub-
stantial ideological distance and strong internal cohesion, makes it rather unlikely that 
the high degree of consensus required for altering the status quo can be achieved. Euro-
pe, in other words, is caught in a joint decision trap.  
But this is not necessarily the end of the story. At this context, it may be illuminating 
to examine at the ways in which our six federations managed to overcome the instituti-
onal rigidities that stymied their early steps towards welfare state consolidation. Recall 
that bypass strategies played an important role in facilitating welfare consolidation and 
that major breakthroughs in the reallocation of powers were only achieved in the con-
text of severe external shocks. The Great Depression and World War II were important 
critical junctures, which not only led to a centralisation of social and fiscal powers but 
also fuelled a wave of solidarity among the population that paved the way for welfare 
state take-off in the post-war period. War and depression are not, of course, eventuali-
ties to be welcomed under any circumstances. Indeed, avoiding such eventualities has 
supplied much for the rationale for post-war EU development. This being so, it becomes 
clear that Europe’s most promising way to deepen social integration is to rely on bypass 
strategies.  
3.4 Bypass Strategies 
Having shown that the European joint decision system is unable to overcome its institu-
tional rigidities, we now explore whether the experience of institutional development in 
our six federal welfare states suggests ways in which bypass strategies could assist in 
circumventing these blockages. 
The experience in the North American federations shows that whenever the federal 
government was denied the power to legislate on social matters, it could rely on its 
spending power in order to stimulate programme development at the level of sub-
ordinate governments. Moreover, the power to provide grants gave the central govern-
ment leverage to influence basic principles of programme design. At the same time, the 
federation’s taxing powers opened an avenue for achieving social policy objectives by 
other means such as tax expenditures and subsidies delivered to privately and occupa-
tionally run programmes. However, in light of Europe’s fiscal constitution, it should be 
clear that this bypass route is blocked. The European Union lacks an autonomous finan-
cial basis for social policy development since it has no genuine fiscal powers. The 
Community’s budget is fed by payments from the Member States, which are related to 
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their capacity to pay. Again, a deep asymmetry between the interests of rich and poor 
Member States, along with the high barriers of consensus required for altering the status 
quo, precludes any major policy shift in fiscal matters. Moreover, as is well known, the 
bulk of such revenues goes to the Common Agricultural Policy, therefore crowding out 
public expenditure devoted to other public policy objectives.   
However, semi-sovereignty in fiscal affairs was also the starting point for the majori-
ty of federations. As already noted, the fiscal powers of the central state were signifi-
cantly extended in wartime and in the aftermath of war. However, some of the European 
federations discovered ways to cope with fiscal shortcomings prior to World War II. 
Taking the parafiscal bypass route of creating autonomous social insurance agencies, 
major social programmes were funded through contributions. Political gridlock was 
avoided by externalizing costs to third parties, i.e. employers and employees, not invol-
ved in the bargaining game between different branches of government However, the 
parafiscal route is no more available in the current EU context than is financial leverage 
through grants from the centre. Though corporatism has gained importance in recent 
years (Falkner 1998), the main roadblock is the variety of welfare regimes patterns in 
the different Member States. Adopting the parafiscal route would automatically imply a 
structural shift towards the Bismarckian social security model that would not have any 
appeal to countries with alternative welfare regime patterns. Indeed, given that, in many 
quarters, the contributory model is blamed for the contemporary economic malaise of 
the countries of continental Western Europe, it might also not be enthusiastically wel-
comed by all the countries in the Bismarckian tradition. 
Thus, the only bypass route remaining is the regulatory route (cf. Majone 1997). 
Here, the Swiss and also the Australian experience is intriguing and shows some paral-
lels with the situation of contemporary Europe. Initially, after the Swiss constitution 
was revised in 1874, labour protection was the only social policy jurisdiction on which 
the federal government could rely. Although this realm was pre-empted by some indus-
trially advanced cantons2, the federal government was able to enact a federal factory law 
in 1877 that regulated working conditions in factories and which made Switzerland a 
leading country in Europe in terms of labour protection. A major reason for this early 
programme adoption was the purely regulatory nature of this policy field that did not 
require major public expenditure. In contrast, redistributive programmes were substan-
tially postponed because of the federation’s lack of fiscal and social security powers. 
                                                 
2  The fact that many cantons had already set up labour legislation actually proved to be highly favourable for fed-
eral legislation because these laws served as a template for designing the Federal Factory Law adopted in 1877. 
This example also clearly demonstrates that federalism occasionally serves  as a political laboratory with catalys-
ing effects for national social policy.  
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Severe struggles between different branches of government and constitutional rigidities 
associated with the reallocation of fiscal powers protracted or even impeded the reallo-
cation of fiscal responsibilities. Only by adopting a parafiscal approach was the federal 
government capable of initiating redistributive programmes3. As a consequence, Swit-
zerland’s welfare state trajectory is marked by a strong asymmetry in terms of the tem-
poral sequence of labour protection legislation and the enactment of social transfer pro-
grammes: While Switzerland was pioneer in regulating working conditions in compara-
tive perspective, the country was in the rearguard regarding the enactment of redistribu-
tive social programmes. The Australian experience illustrates the same dualistic devel-
opment.  The use of the power to arbitrate industrial disputes made it possible to estab-
lish minimum wages and compulsory sick pay by requirements imposed on employers, 
but standard social programmes were initiated late and were miserly in their expenditure 
levels (see Castles, 1985). 
Similar patterns can be observed in Europe. Regulatory social policy has been the 
realm in which social policy progress has been made lasting recent decades for several 
reasons. First of all, no major fiscal resources are required to launch such initiatives. 
Secondly, decision making in this field is based on QMV and is thus less prone to po-
litical deadlock. Interestingly, and with a strong resonance to Australia, where the impe-
tus for regulation were the judgements of the Court of Arbitration, social policy initia-
tives from the centre are unusually court-driven in character. It is as much a series of 
rulings from the European Court of Justice as the process of Commission and Council 
initiatives that has been the source of new social policy. While the Council and Com-
mission are prone to stasis, the ECJ’s institutional design fosters activism—a situation 
emphasised even more in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (CT) signed in Rome in Octo-
ber 2004. The Court relies on simple majority votes, taken in secret, sheltering it from 
the political immobility typical of the EU. Only a unanimous vote of the Council or a 
Treaty revision can undo ECJ decisions when they relate to primary European law. Le-
gal strategies have had the advantage of leaving taxing, spending, and administrative 
powers at the national level—and this is even more the case where the substantive pol-
icy content of those strategies is regulatory in character. It is important, however, to 
emphasise that such a court-led process of social policy development has its own logic. 
Decisions are likely to reflect demands for doctrinal coherence as much as, or more 
than, substantive debates as to the desirability of various social policy outcomes. The 
capacity of reforms built around a judicial logic to achieve substantive goals may be 
                                                 
3  This route, however, attracted the fierce opposition of business interest organisations. In contrast to Germany and 
Austria, Swiss business could launch a referendum to obstruct an increase in non-wage labour costs. Indeed, 
health insurance and pension insurance schemes were rejected in referenda held in 1900 and 1931 respectively. 
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limited. Furthermore, courts may have less need to consider political constraints in pre-
scribing solutions. One danger is that court initiatives may exceed the tolerance of im-
portant political actors within the system. After all, centralised policy-making was made 
difficult in the EU for a reason, and ECJ activism may generate resentment. This is, of 
course, one aspect of the current disquiet over the ‘democratic deficit’. 
The most recent bypass strategy adopted, however, is the attempt to increase policy 
co-ordination between the Member States by means of soft forms of governance. The 
prime example is the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). In its ideal-typical form, 
the OMC is a new type of governance (Radaelli 2003: 8; Mosher/Trubek 2003: 64) that 
can be traced back to the difficulty of achieving uniform policies by means of the clas-
sic binding instruments of hierarchical governance. Instead, the route taken strongly 
emphasizes (semi-) voluntary co-ordination of policies across different levels of gov-
ernment. The main idea is to promote the exchange of information, experience and best 
practice between the Member States and the Commission. More specifically, Art. 140 
ECT stipulates that the “Commission shall encourage cooperation between Member 
States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy fields”. This co-
ordination should be achieved by “making studies, delivering opinions and arranging 
consultations both on problems arising at national level and on those of concern to in-
ternational organisations” (ibid.). It is evident that this bypass route is not legally bind-
ing since it is mainly concerned with monitoring, consulting and recommendations and 
therefore focuses mainly on the diffusion of knowledge. Policy change is thus expected 
to result from policy learning as well as from mechanisms of blaming and shaming con-
nected to benchmarking.  
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to find out whether there are lessons to be learnt from 
welfare state development in the established federal states that can help us to understand 
contemporary patterns as well as future trajectories of EU social policy. In general, 
multi-level systems that are based on strong separation of policy jurisdictions are prone 
to stasis and political gridlock. However, compared to the six federal nation states ana-
lysed here, the European multi-level system is peculiar in many respects. Its unique sys-
tem of joint decision-making inhibits social policy change, with contemporary institu-
tional and actor constellations conforming closely to all the axioms of veto player the-
ory. The proliferation of veto points gives Member States powerful levers to defend the 
status quo. Thus, and in a similar way to the institutional development of the six federa-
tions featuring in our analysis, the policy route that has been taken has been based on 
strategies seeking to bypass the in-built institutional rigidities and limited fiscal and 
administrative capacities of the EU. Specifically, we have identified two genuine bypass 
routes that play a key role in contemporary EU social policy making. The first is 
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strongly regulatory in nature, while the second is principally based on voluntary action 
but simultaneously embedded in a common framework of monitoring and consultation. 
As a result, social policy evolution and harmonisation is likely to be more the result of 
mutual adjustment and incremental accommodation than of central guidance. This 
means that EU social policy development, if it is to happen on any major scale, is a pro-
ject for the very long term. 
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